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Why  Kill Award Fee?
 GAO Report, Defense Acquisitions, Dec 2005
R d d f f t i ti ti ecommen e  re orm o  curren  ncen ve prac ces
 Recommended fee tied to acquisition outcomes
 USD (AT&L) and SAF Policy Letters, Mar-Apr 2006
 Linked fees to performance outcomes
 Rollover to be used only on an exception basis
 DPAP Policy dated 24 Apr 2007      
 SAF/AQ Policy 15 Jun 2007
 Report commissioned by Congress in 2008     
to Review impact of DoD policy changes
 AT&L Policy Initiative – Jun 2010
I n t e g r i t y  - S e r v i c e  - E x c e l l e n c e
Why  Kill Award Fee?
 Recommendations of Audit Report
 Instructed the military services to move to Outcome based award          
fee criteria – achievable & promote accountability for acquisition 
outcomes
 Ensure that award fee structures are motivating excellent 
performance - only pay for above satisfactory performance
 Require appropriate approving officials to approve new contracts 
to make sure that these actions are taken
 Issue Guidance on the use of Rollover
 Develop mechanism for capturing award & incentive data within 
existing data systems
 Develop performance metrics to evaluate the effectiveness
 Develop mechanism to share best practices for acquisition 
strategies
I n t e g r i t y  - S e r v i c e  - E x c e l l e n c e
Why  Kill Award Fee?
 What was the fundamental problem with award & incentive fees?
C t t i i hi h (90% ) d f on rac ors were rece v ng g  +  awar  ees on 
programs perceived by Congress as unsuccessful
 Disconnect in definition of what constitutes success
 Congress focuses on Cost & Schedule
 Major programs over cost & behind schedule
 Fee Determining Officials focus on Mission Success      
 Technical performance & Mission assurance to 
warfighter is criteria for success
Diff t di lt i diff t it i d eren  para gm resu s n eren  success cr er a an  
resultant rating
I n t e g r i t y  - S e r v i c e  - E x c e l l e n c e
Why  Kill Award Fee?
 What were the Weaknesses in DOD’s Use of Award & Incentive 
Fees according to the GAO?    
 The Report Said that the DOD Focuses on contractor 
performance
 Pays most of AF for “improved Ktr performance”      
 Regardless of whether outcomes  fell short of, met or 
exceeded expectations
 Gives Ktr multiple chances to earn fees that they failed to          
earn in previous periods
 Pays Ktr AF for satisfactory performance
 “Even though acquisition regulations and guidance      
intend for such fees to be used to motivate excellent 
performance”
I n t e g r i t y  - S e r v i c e  - E x c e l l e n c e
Why  Kill Award Fee?
 What were the Weaknesses in DOD’s Use of Award & Incentive 
Fees according to the GAO?    
 Does Not Focus on Acquisition Outcomes
 DOD does not effectively link AF criteria to acquisition 
outcomes
 DOD pays Ktr’s AF even if acquisition outcome falls 
short of DOD’s expectations
 DOD Programs  have suffered
 Cost Increases
 Schedule Delays 
 Technical shortcomings to warfighter
 Still Paid Billions in Award Fees
I n t e g r i t y  - S e r v i c e  - E x c e l l e n c e
Why  Kill Award Fee?
 Rollover
P f i d AF f l ti i d rocess o  mov ng unearne   rom one eva ua on per o  
to a subsequent evaluation period
 Guidance from Services said to use Rollover on an exception 
basis
 GAO estimated that 52% of DOD AF contracts used Rollover
 Report also critical of fee for satisfactory performance       
 Important to distinguish between CPAF and other contract 
types with Award Fee as an add-on  - REPORT DID NOT 
DIFFERENTIATE (Indicator that perhaps the GAO did not       
understand award fee use)
I n t e g r i t y  - S e r v i c e  - E x c e l l e n c e
Why  Kill Award Fee?
 GAO Conclusion 
DOD h littl id th t t i ti i  as e ev ence a  mone ary ncen ves mprove 
results as intended
 Recognized disconnect between DOD Senior Acquisition 
Leadership  and DOD contracting and program management 
officials
 “Awarding large amounts of fee for satisfactory or lesser 
performance and offering contractors multiple chances  to 
earn previously withheld fees has fostered an environment in 
which DOD expects to pay and contractors expect to receive 
most of the available award fee regardless of outcomes.”
I n t e g r i t y  - S e r v i c e  - E x c e l l e n c e
Why  Kill Award Fee?
 What Happened Next?
Did DOD t t th fi di f th R t?   con es  e n ngs o  e epor
 Were the obvious inadequacies responded to?
 Did DOD Leadership provide support to the FDO’s 
determinations?
 DOD responded by accepting most of the Findings
 Concurring with three of the seven Findings      
 Partially concurring with four of the seven Findings
 Agreed to conduct a study and issue policy based upon the 
results of that study
I n t e g r i t y  - S e r v i c e  - E x c e l l e n c e
Why  Kill Award Fee?
 DOD has issued several policy letters over the past few years 
with regard to the use of Award Fee contracts        
 Several emphasized that “objective” criteria should be used 
in award fee plans
 This policy was confusing due to the fact that the FAR 
has always stated that there should be a preference for 
objective incentive criteria not subjective ones
 Gradual shift to a policy today that effectively prohibits the 
use of CPAF contract types.
 Other use of Award Fees considered on a case by case basis
 FPIF/AF,CPIF/AF etc.
I n t e g r i t y  - S e r v i c e  - E x c e l l e n c e
Why  Kill Award Fee?
 What’s the Big Deal?
Wh C if li i t CPAF t t t ? o ares  we e m na e  con rac  ypes
 First, and most importantly this Report cast aspersions upon 
Fee Determining Officials throughout the DOD
 Senior Officials within the DOD appeared to accept the 
allegation that FDO’s were either incompetent or corrupt in 
their evaluations of contractor performance
 How else to explain the awarding of fee to contractors who 
had failed to perform the work under their contract
 Contractors being rewarded for ineffective performance is not        
what the taxpayers expect from the government
I n t e g r i t y  - S e r v i c e  - E x c e l l e n c e
Why  Kill Award Fee?
 Is there an alternate explanation for the data gathered by the 
GAO?
 Major Programs seem to be failing, yet fees are awarded that 
seem to be recognizing excellent performance
 The paradigm seems to be incompetent Officials rewarding 
their cronies in Industry
 Perhaps this is not the case
 The difference is clearly in the definition of success
 GAO emphasized Cost & Schedule
 Program Managers emphasize technical performance &      
mission success
I n t e g r i t y  - S e r v i c e  - E x c e l l e n c e
Why  Kill Award Fee?
 Is there an alternate explanation for the data gathered by the 
GAO?
 Initial over-promising  during competitions resulted in 
contracts that had overly optimistic cost and schedule goals 
for highly technical systems
 Development contracts carry substantial risk
 That is the reason for the use of Cost Type contracts
 Pushing the envelop in the development of next       -
generation systems carries inherent risk
 Working through that risk is responsible for some of the 
higher ratings under development award fee contracts      
 FDO’s recognize and reward contractors for dealing with 
that risk
I n t e g r i t y  - S e r v i c e  - E x c e l l e n c e
Why  Kill Award Fee?
 Other considerations
 Fundamental flaw with the Award Fee process is to ask          
individuals to assess the performance of a program that is so 
closely tied to their own performance
 Failure of a program may appear to be failure of the 
go ernment’s program managerv   
 Inherently unfair to ask an individual to evaluate themselves
 DOD has become a one-failure reality and promotions only go to 
those who are “successful”    
 Negative information not well-received
 Having a stake in the game makes it difficult to avoid a bias
 Even those with the integrity to be objective have subtle 
pressures to appear successful– “the conspiracy of hope”
 Only when program appears totally unsuccessful is fee 
eliminated
I n t e g r i t y  - S e r v i c e  - E x c e l l e n c e
Why  Kill Award Fee?
 Other considerations
Th i th t PM’ d C t ti Offi b li ere s a reason a  s an  on rac ng cers e eve 
that Award Fee contracts are effective in ensuring 
communication and responsiveness 
 If FDO’s could not justify their decisions, then they should be 
better trained or removed from their positions
 The award fee contract is effective if properly implemented
 Criteria need to be outcome based
 Administration of all types of contracts requires effective 
communication to be successful   
I n t e g r i t y  - S e r v i c e  - E x c e l l e n c e
Why  Kill Award Fee?
 Bottom Line
 Award Fees out of favor    
 Impact to Services ability to develop systems minimal due to 
lack of new program starts in budget environment
P t t d i 90’ i d ti h rograms s ar e  n s now n pro uc on p ase 
 Minimal use of CPAF contract arrangements 
 Focus now on “efficiencies” translates into cost savings
 Fixed Price contracts to control costs have been attempted in 
the past with limited success
 Damage to Services credibility as Centers of Excellence for 
acquisition severely damaged
 DOD leadership rolled over on the GAO report and did not 
properly defend their FDO’s decisions
I n t e g r i t y  - S e r v i c e  - E x c e l l e n c e
QUESTIONS?
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